We examine the effect that feedback of team member contributions to team production has on individuals' subsequent contributions to team production, particularly for self-regarding individuals (proselfs). Prior literature outlines the adverse effects of free riding, a behavior in which selfregarding individuals often engage. We evaluate how proselfs respond to the type of feedback about team member contributions -input (i.e., time contributed) compared to output (i.e., completed units contributed) -and whether feedback type can mitigate their free riding tendencies. We predict that when proselfs view lower team member contributions, they will respond more negatively when receiving input feedback than output feedback. As input feedback provides a clearer signal of effort choice, lower input feedback of a team member can be interpreted as more intentional than lower output feedback, thereby increasing proselfs' willingness to negatively reciprocate. Further, we predict that when proselfs view higher team member contributions, they will respond less positively with input feedback than with output feedback. As positive responses are costly (in that they allow relatively less time and effort for individual payoffs), input feedback provides relatively more latitude -via strategic motivation and self-serving interpretations -for justification to positively reciprocate less. As proselfs with input feedback respond more negatively to lower team contributions and less positively to higher team contributions than those with output feedback, overall team performance decreases with input feedback. Our findings show that providing output feedback has the potential to mitigate proselfs' tendencies for free riding.
Introduction
Organizations are increasingly using teams of employees and group incentives to promote and achieve organizational goals (Blinder, 1990; Sprinkle & Williamson, 2006; Román, 2009 ).
While employee contributions to team production benefit firms, employees are also held accountable for their individual production and responsibilities. How individuals balance this tradeoff in exerting effort between individual and team performance is important, as both are vital for organizational success.
The increased use of teams raises control issues for organizations, particularly the issue of individuals' free riding on the efforts of others, which can reduce team performance and firm value (Holmstrom, 1982; Sprinkle & Williamson, 2006; Libby & Thorne, 2009) . Free riding can be particularly evident when individuals working in teams are self-regarding (i.e., proselfs), placing a greater focus on maximizing their own payoffs than those of the team.
1 These individuals can, therefore, directly reduce team performance through low cooperation. 2 However, they can also indirectly reduce team performance by adversely affecting the cooperation of others on the team, in that other team members reduce their own cooperation in response to free-riding (Fehr & Gintis, 2007) . This reduction in overall cooperation can occur with even a small minority of self-regarding individuals involved (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) . Further, prior evidence outlines that performance of proself teams is significantly lower than that of teams made up of prosocial individuals (Upton, 2009 ). Thus, we investigate how providing feedback to proselfs concerning team member 1 Proselfs do not necessarily have zero regard for others' payoffs, but rather substantially less regard for others' payoffs than for their own (De Cremer & van Dijk, 2002; Kanagaretnam, Mestelman, Nainar, & Shehata, 2009 ). As such, while the agency theory perspective might predict that proselfs would never contribute to team performance (and therefore they would never be placed in a team by a responsible agent/manager), a more nuanced view would argue that proselfs simply have more regard for their own payoffs than for joint payoffs, which may result in some contribution to team performance, albeit less than that of prosocials (who place more value on joint payoffs).
contributions can affect cooperation and whether different types of team member feedback can mitigate, or potentially exacerbate, this effect.
Feedback is an influential tool managers have at their disposal to combat free-riding.
Providing formal feedback on task effort and performance can motivate individuals to exert greater effort and increase performance (DeShon, Kozlowski, Schmidt, Milner, & Wiechmann, 2004; Hannan, Krishnan, & Newman, 2008; Holderness, Olsen, & Thornock, 2016; Thomas, 2016) .
Further, informal feedback gathered by mutual monitoring can influence the effort individuals are willing to exert toward team goals, as in many environments employees can view the work of others (Ledyard, 1995; Towry, 2003; Zhang, 2007; Arnold, Hannan, & Tafkov, 2015) . Different types of team feedback are available that can provide information to team members. Whether formally collected and communicated (e.g., through management control systems) or informally observed (e.g., through mutual monitoring), team member outputs from (e.g., outcomes) and inputs to (e.g., time) the production function are the most easily discernible. 3 We posit that the type of incomplete feedback (i.e., output vs. input feedback) concerning team member contributions can affect the freeriding behavior of proselfs differently depending on how the feedback is interpreted.
Output feedback communicates team members' contributions to team outcomes (i.e., completed units contributed to the team), which also provides a signal of what team members' efforts are achieving. This measure is incomplete, however, as outcomes are a function of effort allocation and ability. When individuals view feedback about a team member's output contributed to team production, they can be uncertain of whether this output is driven by the team member's effort allocation to the team or by his or her ability. Hence, this uncertainty makes the actions of fellow team members difficult to interpret. Input measures, such as time allocated to team performance, however, provide a more direct signal of team member effort contributed to team performance, as input feedback is mainly driven by team members' effort allocation choice and is not a function of ability. Hence, individuals can view this information as more certain, with a more direct signal of team members' effort allocation, allowing for a clearer interpretation of a fellow team member's actions.
How might proselfs respond to output and input feedback regarding team member contributions to team production? In social environments, such as team settings, individuals can be motivated by both self-interest and social norms, and these motivators can affect how individuals respond to the feedback of others' actions (Camerer, 2003; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003) . Reciprocity is a strong motivator of individual behavior and responses to others, either positively or negatively (Rabin, 1993) . In a team setting, reciprocity can influence how team members contribute to the team based on contributions of fellow team members, and we posit that the type of feedback of team member contributions can affect proselfs' reciprocal responses.
Team contributions are costly and risky, as these contributions take away individual resources and allow others to free ride, which can affect individuals' willingness to reciprocate. We predict that proselfs will negatively reciprocate lower team member contributions by contributing less to the team. This response is not costly and is economically beneficial since these resources can be allocated to proselfs' individual production, making justification of negative reciprocation easier.
Proselfs can also positively reciprocate higher team member contributions by contributing more to the team. However, there is pressure to not positively reciprocate as it is costly (Douthit, 2016) and proselfs are more apt to be self-regarding and will seek reasons not to positively reciprocate (Charness, 2004) . We posit that two factors will affect the extent of proselfs' reciprocal responses to the type of feedback of team member contributions -the interpretation of the strategic motivation of others and self-serving attributions.
If proselfs view input measures of lower team member contributions, they are likely to interpret this as a strategic choice to free ride as they view that others have similar self-serving beliefs. Further, input feedback reveals nothing about ability but rather the team member's effort allocation choice, something that is not so clear with output feedback. Input feedback also promotes a self-serving bias, in that proselfs are able to overestimate their ability (to convert input to output) when they view that they have contributed more effort to the team than their fellow team member.
Thus, we predict that input feedback of lower team member contributions will lead to more negative reciprocity than output feedback.
When proselfs view input feedback of higher team member contributions, they focus on their fellow team member's effort allocation choice and why it was made. As individuals view others as having similar beliefs, proselfs can be surprised at higher team member contributions and interpret this positive action as being strategically motivated -to get others to contribute for their own benefit -which can reduce the desire to positively reciprocate compared to output feedback.
Also, when proselfs view input feedback of higher team member contributions their positive selfconcept is adversely affected. This can bias proselfs to believe their own higher ability led to higher team production, even with less effort exerted, and in turn reduce the need to positively reciprocate.
Thus, we predict that input feedback of higher team member contributions will lead to less positive reciprocity than output feedback.
We further predict that the posited difference in reciprocity to lower and higher team contributions will lead to lower overall team performance with input compared to output feedback.
Finally, we posit that proself responses to team member contributions will differ from those of prosocials, as prosocials view social dilemmas in a more cooperative light with greater regard for others' payoffs (De Cremer & Van Lange, 2001 ).
To test these predictions, we use an experimental setting in which individuals are assigned to teams and are responsible for both individual and team production within an organization, both of which are valuable to the firm. Participants work on a letter search task, and each letter search correctly completed counts as one product of output. Participants' pay for production is dependent on both the amount of time dedicated to production and the number of correctly completed output (i.e., letter searches) allocated to both individual and team production. We also include a bonus for cooperation, which creates an incentive to free ride.
During production periods, participants can allocate their effort to individual and/or team production as they choose. Following the first production period, participants receive feedback concerning their own contributions in terms of output (i.e., correctly completed letter searches) and time to individual and team production. We manipulate the feedback they receive concerning their fellow team member's contribution to team production: output feedback (correctly completed letter searches contributed to team production) or input feedback (time allocated to team production).
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Participants then go through a second production period allocating effort between individual and team production. We examine how reciprocal responses vary based on feedback type and relative team member contribution by measuring the between-period change in the amount of time allocated and the completed production output (i.e., correct letter searches) contributed to the team.
We find that proselfs do reciprocate their fellow team member's team contributions with real effort by contributing more (less) time and production output to the team in response to higher That is, proselfs respond to input feedback about team member contributions with higher negative and lower positive responses, resulting in lower overall team performance compared to output feedback.
We focus our study on proself individuals as they represent a large portion of the workplace (most studies note between 30-50% of individuals; e.g., Upton, 2009; Kanagaretnam et al., 2009) and the presence of only a few proselfs can lead to a "breakdown of cooperation" (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Fehr & Gintis, 2007, pg. 51) . Further, understanding how feedback can mitigate this detrimental effect would be of greater interest for firms since proselfs are more prone to focus on their individual payouts, thus leading to more free-riding behavior in team environments and lower performance of teams made up of proselfs (Upton, 2009) . We show that output feedback of team members' contributions can beneficially reduce the free-riding tendencies of proselfs in teams.
Thus, for organizations that attract individuals who tend to maximize their own welfare regardless of others' (i.e., proselfs) or tend toward an individualistic (as opposed to collectivistic) culture, employing output-based feedback of team member contributions will benefit overall team performance.
Section 2 provides a literature review and hypothesis development. Section 3 describes the experimental method and design. Section 4 presents the results of the experiment, and Section 5 concludes.
Literature Review and Hypotheses
The use of teams (i.e., two or more individuals working toward a common objective) to achieve organizational goals is steadily growing, along with the use of group-based incentives (Blinder, 1990; Sprinkle, 2003; Sprinkle & Williamson, 2006; Lazear & Shaw, 2007; Román, 2009) . Employees must balance their work in teams with their individual responsibilities, as organizations often value and encourage effort in both functions. The use of teams can provide benefits to the organization (e.g., coordination, information flow), but it can also raise control problems that need to be addressed, such as free riding (Sprinkle & Williamson, 2006; Upton, 2009; Tayler & Bloomfield, 2011) . Accounting research has shown that free riding or low team cooperation can adversely affect team performance and outcomes for the organization (e.g., Balakrishnan, Nagarajan, & Sivaramakrishnan, 1998; Rowe, 2004; Libby & Thorne, 2009 ).
The issue of free riding or low team cooperation is especially prevalent when individuals in the team are self-regarding (proselfs). While individuals considered to be proselfs may value the payoffs of others to some extent, they are characterized by placing greater focus on their own payoffs than those of the team as a whole, which can be demonstrated through free-riding behavior.
Proselfs make up a substantial group and their tendency toward low cooperation not only directly reduces team performance, but also does so indirectly by lowering the cooperation of others in the team in response to free-riding. Even a small minority of self-regarding individuals can reduce the contributions of others, leading to a 'breakdown of cooperation" (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999 : Fehr & Gintis, 2007 . Further, evidence has shown that teams of proselfs are generally low performers (Upton, 2009) . In this study, we evaluate whether different types of feedback concerning fellow team member contributions can mitigate (or exacerbate) the free-riding behavior of proselfs.
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As proselfs are more prone to focusing on their individual payouts, and thus leading to more freeriding behavior in team environments, understanding how feedback can mitigate this detrimental effect would be of interest to firms.
Individuals can receive various forms of feedback about their individual and team performance. In a team setting, feedback and social preferences concerning team members' performance can influence individuals' behavior and the effort they are willing to allocate to team performance (Towry, 2003; Rowe, 2004) . One such example is through reciprocity, a contingent social preference, in that individuals tend to respond in kind to the actions of others (Fehr & Falk, 2002; Hannan, 2005) . Individuals can positively reciprocate the cooperation of others even with an economic incentive not to and can receive utility from giving benefits to those who show them kindness (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Luft & Shields, 2009 (Arnold, Hannan, & Tafkov, 2016) . We examine the effect of this incomplete feedback on proselfs' allocations of effort between team and individual tasks.
Team Heterogeneity and Incomplete Feedback
Individuals must choose how to allocate their efforts between their teams' tasks and their own, but many teams are made up of heterogeneous individuals with different abilities (Hamilton, Nickerson, & Owan, 2003; Arnold et al., 2016) . If team members' ability is not known with certainty, this uncertainty can affect how fellow team members interpret feedback concerning one another's contributions to the team . For example, one interpretation of higher team contribution is that it is a kind action intended as a gift, as the team member specifically chose to allocate effort to team production. Conversely, higher team contribution could also be interpreted as a byproduct of higher ability without intent. Similarly, lower team contribution might be interpreted as a penalty from a fellow team member with the intention of diverting effort away from team production, or simply as lower ability without intent. We argue that the interpretation of team contributions can be affected by whether individuals receive feedback concerning team member contributions of outputs or inputs since these types of feedback differ in information content. 
Reciprocal Responses to Team Member Contributions
In our setting, contributing to team production is, by its nature, risky and costly. It is risky in that a fellow team member might choose to free ride by not contributing to team production, and it is costly in that contributions to the team take away limited resources (e.g., time and effort) from individual production, for which individuals receive full credit for their effort and ability. Given this characteristic common to team contributions (i.e., riskier and costlier than individual contributions), reciprocal responses away from team contributions (beneficial to the individual's payouts and thus 'easier' to do) and toward team contributions (risky and costly to the individual's payouts and thus 'harder' to do) will likely be affected differentially.
Individuals can negatively reciprocate lower team member contributions by allocating their effort away from the team to their own production, thus lowering the payout to their fellow team member. This is a weak form of negative reciprocity, which 'punishes' another but is beneficial to the individual, similar to 'concern withdrawal' (Charness & Rabin, 2002) . 6 Proselfs can be motivated to negatively reciprocate in this manner, as it is an economically easy and beneficial action (e.g., free riding on the efforts of others). Positive reciprocity in response to higher team member contributions, on the other hand, is costly for individuals to engage in as it requires allocation of effort and contributions to the team, away from their own production. As proselfs are naturally inclined to be self-regarding, they are likely to find reasons not to positively reciprocate.
We argue that these reciprocal responses differ by feedback type.
Negative Responses to Lower Team Member Contributions
We predict that individuals will reduce their future team contributions after viewing feedback that their fellow team members' contributions are lower than their own; i.e., they will negatively respond to lower team member contributions. We argue, however, that two factors will affect the extent to which proselfs negatively reciprocate lower team member contributions -the interpretation of the strategic motivation of others and self-serving attributions to maintain (or enhance) a positive self-concept. These factors can affect how proselfs interpret the incomplete feedback of their fellow team member's contributions and their subsequent reciprocal actions.
Individuals often underestimate the difference between their own and others' beliefs (Marks & Miller, 1987; Luft, Shields, & Thomas, 2016) . Proselfs can therefore believe that others will behave or interpret information in a similar manner to themselves, and this belief will affect how they interpret and react to others' actions (Kanagaretnam et al., 2009 ). Thus, proselfs will strategically interpret lower team member contributions as free riding by their fellow team members. This interpretation, and the corresponding negative response, will be tempered with output feedback. Since output is a function of both allocated effort (a strategic choice) and ability (a non-strategic characteristic), proselfs are less certain whether the lower contribution of outputs to team production is due to a strategic or a non-strategic factor, thereby limiting the justification for further negative reciprocity. However, when proselfs view input feedback of lower team contributions, their attention is focused on the team member's choice of effort, which is not a function of ability. Thus, if proselfs view input feedback as a clearer signal of a strategic choice, then they are more likely to interpret lower team member contributions as intended. This, in turn, would increase their negative response (Offerman, 2002; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006) .
These negative reciprocal responses can also be affected by proselfs seeking to sustain a positive self-concept. Individuals are motivated to maintain a positive self-view, and this motivation can lead proselfs to interpret information in a self-serving manner to enhance their concept of self (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008) . Viewing lower team member contributions can increase proselfs' positive self-concept as they see they contributed more to the team or 'performed better' than a fellow team member. If proselfs receive input feedback of lower team member contributions, their positive self-view is supported, but they can also engage in further self-serving attributions by overestimating their ability, thus bolstering their positive self-image even further. Overestimating their ability will lead proselfs to believe that not only did they contribute more effort to the team, but they probably contributed proportionally more output to the team as well. This interpretation can lead to a greater perceived difference between proselfs' own contributions compared to those of their fellow team members, and in turn create justification for greater negative reciprocity.
Conversely, if proselfs view output feedback of lower team member contributions, then there is less opportunity for this self-serving bias, as proselfs can directly compare their output to their fellow team members' output. This leads to the following prediction:
H1: Proselfs who view input feedback of lower team member contributions will decrease subsequent team contributions more compared to those who view output feedback of lower team member contributions.
Positive Responses to Higher Team Member Contributions
Reciprocity theory suggests that as individuals view higher team member contributions, they will respond with positive actions (e.g., subsequently contributing more to the team) (Rabin, 1993; Fehr & Falk, 2002) . Charness (2004) argues, however, that there is downward pressure on positive reciprocity given its costly nature. Thus, when proselfs face a situation in which positive reciprocity is expected, their mindset will be one of searching for reasons to not positively reciprocate, which differs from a situation in which negative reciprocity is expected. Following the development for H1, as input feedback can provide a clearer signal of effort choice, it would seem reasonable that if proselfs view input feedback of higher team member contributions (relative to output feedback), then they would interpret this action as intended and respond more positively. We argue and provide theory, however, that input feedback allows proselfs more room to justify reduced positive responses to higher team member contributions compared to output feedback. Further, as with negative reciprocity, we posit that this effect on proselfs' positive reciprocal actions is affected by two factors -the interpretation of the strategic motivation of others and self-serving attributions to maintain a positive self-concept.
As individuals often underestimate the difference between their own and others' beliefs, proselfs expect that others have the same self-regarding nature and will behave or interpret information in a similar manner as themselves (Marks & Miller, 1987; Kanagaretnam et al., 2009; Luft et al., 2016) . Thus, higher team contributions from a fellow team member can be surprising to proselfs, leading them to consider the motivation behind this action and whether this positive action from the team member is strategic or self-regarding. Stanca, Bruni, & Corazzini (2009) argue that if positive actions can be interpreted as strategically motivated to be self-serving -a team member contributing to the team so that other team members will contribute more to the first contributor's benefit -then this interpretation can reduce positive reciprocal responses. Thus, if proselfs believe that others are acting in a self-regarding manner and interpret positive team member actions as selfserving, positive responses will be reduced.
We argue that if proselfs view input feedback showing higher team member contributions, then their focus is on the team members' choice of effort and why this action was taken. Since the uncertainty of team member ability is less salient with input feedback than for those receiving output feedback, proselfs receiving input feedback will be more likely to attribute a positive action to a strategic motive of their team member, which will reduce their positive reciprocal responses. As output feedback is affected by both effort allocation and ability, proselfs will be less certain in their interpretation of fellow team members' higher contributions. This would lead to a lower likelihood that higher team member contributions would be attributed to a self-serving motive and a greater positive response to these contributions. Thus, proselfs will positively respond more to output feedback showing higher team member contributions compared to input feedback.
Proselfs' positive reciprocal responses can also be affected by the desire to maintain a positive self-image. Viewing higher team member contributions can hurt proselfs' positive selfconcept, as a fellow team member has contributed more or 'performed better' than they did. Thus, proselfs will try to interpret feedback in a manner to protect their positive self-concept. If proselfs view input feedback showing higher team member contributions, then to keep a positive selfconcept they can rationalize that although they allocated less effort to the team, their own ability is higher, which should result in higher output for the team. This self-serving interpretation of input feedback by proselfs can reduce positive responses to higher team member contributions, as proselfs are free to believe they have contributed through higher output (although this is unknown).
Conversely, if proselfs view output feedback showing higher team member contributions, then to maintain a positive self-concept they can rationalize that their fellow team member must have allocated more time or effort to the team (as compared to having a higher ability). Thus, proselfs are motivated to respond more positively to output feedback by increasing team contributions, as they perceive that their fellow team member contributed both more effort and output to the team. This leads to the following prediction:
H2: Proselfs who view input feedback of higher team member contributions will increase subsequent team contributions less compared to those who view output feedback of higher team member contributions.
These two hypotheses predict proselfs' differential reactions to feedback type based on the relative contributions of team members, and lead to an interaction prediction in the reciprocal team contributions of proselfs, with positive (negative) reciprocation expected for higher (lower) relative team contributions. We further posit that the asymmetrical reactions to input vs. output feedback by proselfs can differentially affect overall team performance (i.e., time allocated and output contributed to team production). We argue that for proselfs, input feedback will elicit more negative response (i.e., effort allocated away from team production) to lower team contributions, and less positive response (i.e., effort allocated toward team production) to higher team contributions, compared to output feedback. These responses to team member contributions will then lead to lower overall team performance with input feedback relative to output feedback, as more effort is allocated away from the team compared to toward the team. 
H3:
For proselfs who view input feedback of team member contributions, overall team performance will decrease compared to proselfs who view output feedback.
We have focused our hypotheses on how the behavior of proselfs is influenced by the type of incomplete team member feedback. We do so since proselfs are more prone to free riding in group settings and can cause even those less prone (e.g., prosocials) to engage in more free riding (Fehr & Gintis, 2007 When prosocials view input feedback of higher team member contributions, they will be less inclined to interpret these contributions as strategically motivated, compared to proselfs, but are more likely to interpret the action as an intended kindness and a portrayal of trust, as they are likely to believe that others share their same prosocial focus. This reaction can be tempered, however, with output feedback as it is harder for prosocials to disentangle whether higher team contributions are due to an intended choice to allocate effort to the team or to ability. Hence, we argue that converse to proselfs, prosocials will positively respond more to higher team member contributions with input feedback compared to output feedback. Further, prosocials will be less inclined to punish lower team contributions as they focus more on the fact that their fellow team member is allocating at least some effort to the team.
Thus, we argue that the pattern of responses to team member contributions following input and output feedback for prosocials will differ from that of proselfs.
H4:
The interactive effect of feedback type and relative team contribution on subsequent contributions to team production will differ between proselfs and prosocials.
Setting
Prior research in economics has examined how individuals react when their choices influence not only their own payouts, but also the payouts of others (i.e., cooperation behavior).
Public goods and prisoner dilemma experiments have been used to evaluate factors such as team communication, team size, and decision timing, which affect when individuals will cooperate with the team or free ride (e.g., see Axelrod & Dion, 1988 and Zelmer, 2003 for reviews) . 8 These studies generally use tasks with effort choice, not real effort, to examine these effects on effort allocation.
Further, teams in these studies generally consist of homogeneous individuals, as they each receive a similar allotment or set of possible decisions. Our setting of interest, however, allows for 1) individuals to work toward multiple, value-added responsibilities (i.e., individual and team production), 2) teams to consist of members who are heterogeneous in their ability levels, 3) a bonus for joint cooperation as well as an incentive to free ride on the team contributions of the other team member, and 4) individuals to respond with real effort to feedback regarding the team contributions of their fellow team member.
Method and Design

Participants
Participants in the experiment are 226 undergraduate and graduate students at two Midwestern research universities (Proselfs = 117, Prosocials = 106, and Unclassified = 3). Their average age is about 20 years old (range 18-39) and 58 percent are female. 9 Participants receive 8 We note that team cooperation in this study is operationalized in an additive performance task (i.e., team performance is determined by adding team contributions). Future research can examine the effect of incomplete feedback on team performance in a conjunctive (i.e., team performance is determined by the lowest team contribution) or a disjunctive (i.e., team performance is determined by the highest team contribution) task setting . 9 There are no school or gender effects that alter the inferences of our statistical results. 
Instructions and Task
Upon consenting to take part in the study, participants first complete a task used to elicit their social value orientation (proself vs. prosocial) by selecting one of three hypothetical payoff options for self and other, each option indicating a preference for individual, joint, or relative payoffs (Van Lange et al., 1997; Upton, 2009) . After selecting an option for each of nine different scenarios, the participants proceed to the next task.
For the remainder of this study, we use a computerized version of the letter search task used in Kachelmeier, Thornock, & Williamson (2016) to elicit participant effort. This task is sensitive to effort and allows for differences in ability and natural team heterogeneity. 11 After participants are introduced to the letter search task, they are given time to practice and gain assurance that their performance is sensitive to the level of effort exerted. Following the practice session, participants are told that they will complete a series of paid production periods, 12 and that they will be assigned to work in a team with another, anonymous participant in the session.
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During the production periods, participants have the opportunity to allocate their effort to individual and team performance. They are told that their pay is dependent on both individual and team performance, based on both the amount of time allocated (i.e., input) and the number of 10 Approval for this study was granted by the IRB at the institutions where the experiment took place. 11 As evidence of heterogeneity in ability, correct letter searches from the first production period ranged from 11 to 72, with an average of 36.37 and a standard deviation of 11.09. Also, this variable is normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk statistic = 0.990, p = 0.571). 12 Given that the number of periods is not made explicit, there was enough uncertainty as to whether the task would last for two or three production periods within the estimated timeframe that participants were to be in the lab so as to minimize concerns of end-period gaming. Participants were debriefed after the study as to why the number of periods was not disclosed. 13 Participants are randomly and anonymously assigned to teams of two. correct letter searches allocated (i.e., output) for both individual and team performance. Total team performance (by both team members) is multiplied by 1.2 and divided by two when determining the payout. This is done in order to provide a bonus if each team member allocates effort to team performance, but also offers the opportunity to free ride. The weightings on output and time in the calculation of final pay are equivalent, but this is not explicitly communicated to the participants.
14 Participants are given a range of time that their team member has to work, to provide some uncertainty for inputs, and are then shown the amount of time they themselves can work at the beginning of each production period.
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In each production period, participants work on the letter search task, allocating their time (and their corresponding completed output) between individual and team performance. The task is constructed such that participants can choose to allocate their effort between individual and team performance as they desire throughout each period (see Appendix for screenshots of the task interface). After the first period, participants receive feedback on their own output (i.e., number of correct letter searches) and time (i.e., seconds) dedicated to individual and team performance, as well as feedback on their fellow team member's team performance depending on condition (output or time). 16 Following this feedback, each participant works on the same task in the second period, again allocating his or her effort between individual and team performance. They receive feedback similar to that provided after the first period, and are then directed to answer post-experiment 14 Participants are informed that both individual and team performance are valued, but we make no explicit statement of equal value or what the compensation ratio would be. This is done to allow for the examination of team cooperation, without adding a directional effect of incentives. 15 A range of time for the fellow team member is provided to allow for differences in interpretation of the input feedback. However, to facilitate comparison across participants, all participants were given the same amount of time in each period -20 minutes (1200 seconds) -to work on the task, which fell in the given range. All participants were debriefed on this point at the end of the study. 16 Participants were not informed beforehand of their feedback condition, though they were informed that they would get information about their fellow team member's contribution to the team. This design choice was made as the focus of the study is on the interpretation of different feedback types, and not the anticipation of feedback. Further, participants viewed feedback of either their fellow team member's output or time contribution to the team, but did not receive sufficient information to infer the non-disclosed contribution.
questions. Completed output and time allocated to team performance is measured in both periods to evaluate changes due to feedback from the first period.
Experimental Design and Treatments
The experiment consists of a 2 x 2 between-subjects design, with relative team member contribution (Lower or Higher) as a measured variable and (incomplete) team member performance feedback (Output or Input Feedback) as a manipulated variable. We measure relative team member contribution by comparing the output or input (depending on feedback condition) of each participant's team contribution to that of his or her assigned team member. If participants see that their assigned team member provided lower (higher) output or input (based on feedback condition) than they did, then they belong to the Lower (Higher) relative team member contribution condition. 17 We manipulate the type of team member feedback each participant receives after the first production period. Participants receive information regarding the number of correct letter searches completed while working on team performance (Output Feedback) or information regarding the amount of time (in seconds) dedicated to team performance (Input Feedback).
From the first task given to the participants, we measure their social value orientation (SVO) as either Proself or Prosocial. If the participant selected the individual-or relative-payoffmaximizing option for the majority (five or more) of the nine scenarios, we classify them as
Proself.
18 If the participant selected the joint-payoff-maximizing option for the majority (five or more) of the nine scenarios, we classify them as Prosocial.
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17 Two dyads (four participants -two proselfs and two prosocials) saw feedback that their team contribution was the same as that of their assigned team member. These participants are excluded from our analyses, as we are interested in how individuals respond to differences in contributions to team performance. 18 Collapsing individualist and competitive SVO types is consistent with prior research (De Cremer & Van Lange, 2001) . In untabluated analyses, we find no significant effects of SVO type within the proself designation on our variables of interest. 19 Prior literature has generally used a cutoff of six or more payoff selections of a certain SVO type in order to classify an individual. In order to reduce the number of participants who are deemed unclassified, we use a cutoff of five or more. All results are inferentially identical if we use the stricter classification methodology in prior literature. In the end,
Dependent Measures
We focus on two dependent variables of interest in our study. The first is the individual change in contributions allocated to team performance from Period 1 to Period 2. We measure this in terms of outputs, the change in letter searches completed for the team, and inputs, the change in time allocated to team production. The second is the change in overall team performance. We measure this as the change in total letter searches completed and total time allocated to the team from Period 1 to Period 2.
Results
Relative Team Contribution Effect on Reciprocity
To provide a baseline for our predictions, we first evaluate whether proselfs' responses to team member contributions follow reciprocal behavior [i.e., responding to kindness (unkindness) with kindness (unkindness)]. To determine a benchmark for comparison, individuals can naturally use their own team contributions to compare their fellow team member's team contributions (Fehr & Falk, 2002 
Self-Serving Attribution -Measure of Positive Self-View
In order to examine whether viewing input feedback leads proselfs to justify increasing their negative responses to lower team member contributions due to preservation of their self-view, we asked participants to rate how much they believed s/he contributed to team performance relative to their fellow team member on the unknown piece of feedback (e.g., if input feedback was viewed, the question related to the amount of team output and vice versa). This rating was on a Likert scale of -50 to 50, with a midpoint of 0 representing a belief that their own team contribution relating to the unknown component was the same as their fellow team member. Those who received input feedback showing lower team member contributions rated their own team output contribution as much higher than their team member's unknown output (30.45) compared to those receiving output feedback, who rated their own input contribution relative to their fellow team member as only somewhat higher (20.85). This difference is significant (untabulated, p = 0.05, one-tailed), which supports our argument that when receiving input feedback, proselfs rationalize that they performed even better on the unknown measure than their fellow team member, thus giving cause for a greater negative response. 
Positive Response to Higher Team Contributions (H2)
Strategic Motivation -Measure of Self-Servingness of Others
We hypothesize that positive responses will be lower for proselfs who view input feedback showing higher team member contributions than for those who view output feedback. We argue that with input feedback, proselfs are more likely to interpret the behavior of others as self-serving and rationalize their own behavior in a self-preserving manner. To evaluate whether viewing input feedback leads proselfs to interpret higher team member contributions as more self-serving, after completing the second production period but before seeing the results of this period, we asked participants who received higher team member contribution feedback after the first production 22 To ensure that proselfs did not think that their fellow team member had any more or less time available to them, on average, to perform the task, we analyzed responses on a Likert scale (0 to 100) to the question "How much time did you think that your fellow team member was given to complete the letter searches?" with 0 representing "Much less time than I had", 50 representing "About the same amount of time as I had", and 100 representing "Much more time than I had". Proselfs gave an average response of 50.6, which is not statistically different than the midpoint of 50 (p = 0.59, two-tailed), and we find no difference based on feedback type (p = 0.22, two-tailed).
period to rate on a Likert scale (0 to 100) the extent that their team member's higher contribution was self-serving. Proselfs viewing input feedback rated their team member's higher contribution as more self-serving (53.84) than those viewing output feedback (46.38). Although this finding is in the predicted direction, the difference only approaches significance (untabulated, p = 0.12, onetailed). If extreme ratings are removed [i.e., ratings of 0 (n = 2) and 100 (n = 3)], however, then the difference is significant (p = 0.04, one-tailed). Further, an untabulated Mann-Whitney test with all observations included shows that the self-servingness rating is (marginally) significantly higher for those viewing input feedback than for those viewing output feedback (p = 0.08, one-tailed). This provides some support for the idea that when receiving input feedback (compared to output feedback), proselfs are more likely to interpret the higher team contributions of others as more selfserving, and thus they are less likely to respond positively.
Self-Serving Attribution -Measure of Positive Self-View
To evaluate whether viewing input feedback leads proselfs to justify their lower team contributions in a self-preserving manner, we again examine how participants rated their perception of their contribution to the team compared to their fellow team member on the unknown piece of feedback. As noted, this rating is on a Likert scale from -50 to 50, with a midpoint of 0 representing a belief that the individual's performance on the unknown piece of feedback was the same as their fellow team member. Those who received input feedback showing higher team member contributions rated their output contribution as statistically no different to their team member's output (-5.41; p = 0.19, two-tailed) , while those receiving output feedback showing higher team member contributions rated their input contribution as significantly less than their fellow team member (-21.03; p < 0.01, two-tailed). The difference in these ratings is significant (untabulated, p < 0.01, one-tailed), supporting our argument that with input feedback, proselfs rationalize that they contributed similarly to the team as their fellow team member on the unknown measure, thus reducing the need for a positive response.
Feedback Type and Relative Team Member Contribution
We hypothesize that proselfs will respond more to lower team member contributions and less to higher team member contributions when viewing input feedback compared to output. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for proselfs' positive and negative responses to team member contributions. To examine the interaction of feedback type and relative team member contributions on reciprocal responses, we multiply the negative responses by -1 to put all responses (negative and positive) in a common sign and evaluate the "level" of reciprocal response to team member contributions. Figure 1 illustrates the disordinal form of the interaction between feedback type and relative team member contribution on expected reciprocal responses.
<INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE>
We test this interaction for proselfs using a general linear model with either the reciprocal response to team output (letter searches) or team time from Period 1 to Period 2 as the dependent variable and team member feedback type (Output, Input) and relative team member contribution (Lower, Higher) as the independent variables. Table 2 shows that using the reciprocal response in proselfs' team output or input as the independent variable, there is no significant main effect (ps > .10) in the model, but the interaction of feedback type and relative team member contribution is significant (ps = 0.01, one-tailed). Thus, feedback type and relative team member contribution disordinally interact to affect proselfs' responses to team member feedback.
23 23 To control for any effect that the magnitude of the viewed difference between the team members' contributions might have on individuals' subsequent contributions to team performance, we create a z-transformed continuous measure of the viewed difference between team members' team contributions as the independent variable (instead of the dichotomous distinction of higher or lower). We z-transform the difference for comparability purposes, as half of the participants saw the difference in seconds of time contributed and the other half saw the difference in completed letter searches contributed. We continue to find statistically significant interactions of this measure and the type of feedback (Output, Input) on the dependent variables of interest (both ps < 0.05, one-tailed).
<INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE>
Change in Team Performance (H3)
We predict that for proselfs, the asymmetry in negative and positive reciprocal responses to input feedback, compared to output feedback, of team member contributions will reduce subsequent overall team performance. As documented above, with input feedback, lower team member contributions lead to a more negative response than with output feedback (H1). Further, with input feedback, higher team member contributions lead to a less positive response than with output feedback (H2). Thus, we predict that overall team performance will decrease more from Period 1 to Period 2 with input feedback than with output feedback. Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for the change in overall team performance (i.e., contributed letter searches and time for the team as a whole) from Period 1 to Period 2. We had 32 teams made up of proselfs with 16 teams receiving input feedback and 16 teams receiving output feedback. Using team observations as the level of analysis, we find that total letter searches completed by the team decrease, on average, by 5.13 letter searches for teams receiving input feedback but increase by 3.19 letter searches for teams receiving output feedback. This difference is statistically significant (p = 0.03, one-tailed). 24 Total time allocated to the team also decreases for teams with input feedback by 171.25 seconds, on average, whereas team time increases for teams with output feedback by 45.81 seconds, resulting in a significant difference (p = 0.04, one-tailed).
These findings provide support for H3, outlining an adverse effect from input feedback on overall team performance when team members are proselfs.
<INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE> 24 Some experimental sessions had an odd number of participants, causing a few to receive feedback from a team member already assigned to a dyad. Thus, these participants viewed feedback from a fellow team member, but the fellow team member did not view that participant's feedback from the first period. These "individual" observations were removed for the team performance analysis. Inferences are not qualitatively different if they are included.
Dimensions of Effort (H1 and H2)
Our examination of proselfs' response to team member contributions and feedback type has centered on one component of effort -duration (i.e. time) -and on the output of effort and skillcompleted production. We focus the analysis on effort duration for three reasons. First, the change in effort duration dedicated to team production is cleanly measured in this setting. Second, the choice of effort duration is salient to participants as they actually click a button to switch between "Individual Performance" and "Group Performance", which also causes the display color to change.
Third, the change in effort duration explains a substantial amount of the variation in the change of team output (81.5%, p < 0.001).
However, effort intensity -how hard an individual works given the amount of time -could also play a role in proselfs' response to team member contributions. 25 For example, one could negatively respond to lower team member contributions by working less hard on team production than on individual production. One of the benefits of having a real effort task is that it allows for some capability to measure the construct of effort intensity by comparing the efficiency of one's individual output to that of their team output (i.e., letter searches completed per minute for individual compared to team production). This measure controls for individual ability in the task and compares the relative efficiency of individual and team production. A change in this measure from the first to the second production period would be indicative of a response through effort intensity towards or away from team production.
26
We test our hypotheses using this measure of change in effort intensity to determine if proselfs respond to relative team member contributions and feedback type through a relative change in effort intensity. In Panel C of Table 1 , we present the means (standard deviations) for our measure of a change in effort intensity. We note that proselfs do reciprocate through effort intensity to higher and lower team member contributions (untabulated, p = 0.06, one-tailed). Next, we find that proselfs who view input feedback of lower team member contributions shift their effort intensity more toward (i.e., become more efficient in) their individual production relative to their team production compared to those with output feedback (p = 0.07, one-tailed), supporting H1.
To test H2, we examine the effect of feedback type for those who view higher team member contributions. We find that the means are in the expected direction in that those with input feedback shift their effort intensity more towards their individual production relative to their team production compared to those with output feedback, however, the difference is not significant (p = 0.18, onetailed). Finally, we examine the effect of feedback type and relative team member contribution on the reciprocal response of effort intensity. We find a significant interaction (untabulated, p = 0.04, one-tailed) on effort intensity, in which proselfs with input feedback positively reciprocate less and negatively reciprocate more than those with output feedback. 27 In sum, in addition to clearly responding through effort duration, proselfs also appear to reciprocally respond in terms of effort intensity to the type of feedback they receive and their relative team contribution.
Proselfs vs. Prosocials (H4)
We examine the effect of SVO (Proself vs. Prosocial) on the relation between feedback type and relative team member contribution on a change in team contributions. All of the following tests are untabulated unless noted. First, we note that proselfs contribute significantly less output and time to team production in Period 1 than do prosocials (ps < 0.05, two-tailed), supporting prior research that these groups have a different social orientation (e.g., Van Lange et al., 1997 Table 4 . Using either the reciprocal change in one's contributed team output or team time as the dependent variable, we note a significant three-way interaction between the independent variables, providing evidence that proselfs and prosocials respond differently to incomplete feedback about team member contributions (ps < 0.01, two-tailed), supporting H4.
<INSERT Stouten et al., 2005) . This focus on the collective can affect how prosocials view input feedback and respond to the effort that other team members contribute to the team. We find that when prosocials view input feedback, they respond more positively than proselfs to higher team member contributions (p = 0.04, one-tailed), but respond less negatively to lower team member contributions (p = 0.03, one-tailed). These results also support H4 and demonstrate a greater willingness for prosocials to give their fellow team member the benefit of the doubt with input feedback, finding ways to justify positively reciprocating more and negatively reciprocating less (Stouten et al., 2005) . Additionally, we observe that with input feedback prosocials find lower team member contributions less unkind and intended than proselfs do (ps < 0.06, one-tailed), consistent with prior research. Lastly, we find that prosocials attribute higher team member contributions less to the self-servingness of others than do proselfs (p = 0.10, one-tailed).
Prior research on social value orientation also examines overall performance of teams by their SVO composition, showing that prosocial teams outperform proself teams (Upton, 2009 Further, we find a significant difference for proself teams between feedback type (p = 0.02, onetailed), consistent with H3, but not for prosocial teams (p = 0.38, two-tailed). Interestingly, our results show that providing output feedback to proself teams is beneficial as the performance of these teams is not significantly different from that of prosocial teams (regardless of feedback provided) [ps > 0.50, two-tailed] . In summary, while proself team performance is hindered by input feedback, there is no difference from prosocial team performance (with either input or output team member feedback) as long as proself teams receive output team member feedback.
Summary & Discussion
We evaluate how self-regarding individuals respond to incomplete feedback portraying team member contributions to team production and the subsequent effect on overall team performance.
We focus on self-regarding or proself individuals in our study as they represent a large portion of the workplace, have the greatest tendency to free ride, and their free-riding tendencies can reduce the cooperation of other team members. While research in accounting has evaluated some effects of feedback on individual motivation for both individual and team tasks, there has been limited focus on how individuals allocate effort between individual and team production when both are valued and rewarded by the organization, as well as how incomplete feedback affects this allocation decision.
We find that proselfs respond with changes in real effort to team member contributions, responding to higher (lower) team member contributions with more (less) effort to the team. We also provide evidence that responses of proselfs to team member contributions depend on both feedback type and relative team member contribution. Our findings show that proselfs who view input feedback (compared to output feedback) of team member contributions respond more negatively to lower team contributions and less positively to higher team contributions. These proself responses lead to lower overall team performance with input feedback compared to output feedback. The key factor moderating the response to feedback is the uncertainty inherent in interpreting output feedback, prompting proselfs to give their fellow team member the "benefit of the doubt." This is consistent with other research streams that show an association between uncertainty and leniency (Ganzach & Krantz, 1991; Kachelmeier & Van Landuyt, 2017) .
Further, likely due to prosocials approaching social dilemmas with a more cooperative mindset, we find that prosocials give their fellow team members the "benefit of the doubt", through higher positive and lower negative reciprocity, when viewing input feedback compared to output feedback. These actions lead to higher team performance from prosocial teams compared to proself teams with input feedback. However, we show that providing proself teams with output feedback concerning team member contributions mitigates the lower performance by proself teams compared to prosocial teams, offering evidence of a benefit of providing output feedback to proselfs within teams.
Our findings can be useful for managers in a number of ways. First, even though input feedback can provide a more direct signal of team member effort, managers in industries that tend to attract self-regarding individuals might consider using outcome feedback for employee teams and joint work to maximize total contribution to team performance and firm value. Second, there is a growing trend for firms to collect personality measures in both the screening process of prospective employees (Weber & Dwoskin, 2014) and in the continuing professional development of current employees (Passmore, 2012; Turner, 2012) . 28 With this knowledge of the individual characteristics of those composing their teams, managers can use the flexibility allowed by their performance feedback systems to better motivate behavior beneficial to firm performance. Third, we identify a potential performance benefit for virtual (or dispersed) teams compared to teams that work in physical proximity to each other, such as the open-office environment. As output (input) feedback is much more likely to be available for virtual teams (teams in close physical proximity), contributions to team production are likely to be higher (lower) when these teams are comprised of proself individuals.
Further, this study responds to the call by Sprinkle & Williamson (2006) for increased research into incentive issues in workgroups and teams. We evaluate how individuals allocate their effort between individual and team tasks dependent on team member feedback when the organization values and provides incentives for both individual and team production. In this case, there is a bonus for cooperation, but also an incentive to free ride. Several studies in accounting illustrate the issue of free riding and its corresponding adverse effects, and we add to this research by evaluating the effect of team member feedback on those individuals with the tendency to free ride (i.e., proselfs) (Balakrishnan et al., 1998; Rowe, 2004; Fehr & Gintis, 2007; Libby & Thorne, 2009; Tayler & Bloomfield, 2011) . We contribute to this accounting literature by demonstrating that feedback type and relative team member contribution can differentially affect proselfs' real effort 28 It is also interesting to note from prior research that individuals naturally make assessments of others' personalities (Lievens, DeFruyt, & Van Dam, 2001 ) and even that observers' rating of others' personalities can be more accurate than their self-assessments (Mount, Barrick, & Strauss, 1994; Funder, 2012 Hence, our findings identify a potential benefit of output feedback when individual team members have a proself focus -increased cooperation through less negative responses and stronger positive responses from team members compared to input feedback -which can outweigh some of the documented costs of using this feedback mechanism (Brehmer, 1980; Balzer, Doherty, & O'Connor, 1989) .
APPENDIX Task Interface Screenshots
Screenshot while contributing to group performance
Screenshot while contributing to individual performance
Background colors are randomly determined at the beginning of the experiment and held constant throughout for each participant. a This variable represents the type of feedback that individuals received on their fellow team member's contribution to group performance -either time devoted to group production or correct output contributed to group production. b This variable denotes the relative level of group contribution that individuals view in the feedback available compared to that of their fellow team member -either higher or lower. c This variable represents the change from the first production period to the second in correct letter searches contributed to group production by the individual. d This variable represents the change from the first production period to the second in time devoted to group production by the individual. e This variable represents the change from the first production period to the second in ratio of correct letter searches completed per minute (i.e., relative efficiency) devoted to individual versus group production. A positive (negative) change in the ratio represents greater relative efficiency in individual (group) output in the second production period compared to the efficiency ratio in the first production period. 
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